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Abstract
The paper analyzes the innite-horizon alternating-o!ers bargaining game
between agents with inequity-averse preferences. Without prior investments,
the model predicts a shift of the outcome towards equal division. Asymmetric
investments a!ect the ex-post bargaining outcome, giving an advantage to
the party that contributed more. Under suitable circumstances, this e!ect
may signicantly mitigate the hold-up problem. In fact, in a symmetric set-
up, if production is su"ciently protable, and parties are su"ciently patient,
then the rst-best investment levels can be approximated without a contract.
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1. Introduction
The alternating-o!ers bargaining model developed by Stahl (1972) and Ru-
binstein (1982) has found many useful applications in the economic litera-
ture. The model considers the bargaining process between two parties in a
discrete-time framework. Specically, in the initial period, Party 1 is called
up to make an o!er on how to divide a given pie of a perfectly divisible good.
Party 2 may then accept or reject the o!er. After an rejection, negotiations
are delayed to the next period. At the begining of that period, the value of
the good depreciates for both parties, and Party 2 is called up to make an of-
fer. Party 1 can then either accept or reject this o!er. In the innite-horizon
version of the bargining game, the right to make an o!er goes back and forth
between the two parties until one o!er is accepted, and payo!s can be made.
While the model is analytically very convenient, experimentalists such as
Roth and Ochs (1989) found that the assumed utility specication may not
fully explain the behavior that is typically observed in the laboratory. For
example, subjects might consider the equal division of the pie as a focal
point which inuences the bargaining outcome. To reconcile the theoretical
prediction with the experimental results, Bolton (1991) proposed to use a
rened utility specication: In his model, an agent is motivated not only by
his or her absolute monetary payo!, but also by the relative size of this payo!
compared to the other agent’s payo!. Bolton’s approach explains a number
of experimental ndings on alternating-o!ers bargaining games, such as the
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posing of disadvantageous countero!ers after a rejection, and the occurrence
of rejections. However, and in spite of the explanatory power of the chosen
utility specication, Bolton expresses a feeling of uneasiness with it. At the
end of the article, he writes:
“Why are people, at least in some situations, willing to pay for
fair treatment? It is a key question, as of yet without an answer.”
G. Bolton (1991, p. 1129)
In this paper, we address the above issue from a theoretical perspective. We
consider simultaneous investment decisions of two agents that subsequently
divide the jointly produced output by negotiations. Contractual arrange-
ments are excluded. For this specic situation, we show that fairness pref-
erences may lead to more e"cient investment decisions when compared to
standard preferences. In fact, if production is su"ciently protable, then
the rst best investment levels can be approximated for su"ciently patient
agents. Thus, a community consisting of individuals with fairness preferences
would be economically more successful than another community consisting
of individuals with standard preferences.
To avoid potential misunderstandings, we wish to stress that fairness (or
inequity aversion) is not outright altruism. An altruistic agent is someone
who may prefer giving away some of his payo! to another agent. This is
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not necessarily the case for an agent with fairness preferences. An agent
with fairness preferences will in general prefer a higher payo! to a lower
payo!, even if the payo! di!erence would be given to some other agent.
For example, in a bargaining situation, agents with fairness preferences will
normally exhibit strictly conicting interests. In di!erence to a standard
utility specication, however, the loss of a marginal share below the “fair”
division creates a larger disutility for an agent with fairness preferences than
an equal-sized loss of a marginal share above this value.
This general denition of fairness has been introduced independently in two
papers. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) develop a theory of inequity aversion vis-
a`-vis an individual opponent, and apply it to explain the experimental data
drawn from the ultimatum games, the various models of competition and
cooperation, as well as the dictator and gift-exchange games. Bolton and
Ockenfels (2000) consider a set-up where an agent compares his or her payo!
to the average payo! of the agents in a given reference group. Their model
explains experimental results from the ultimatum and dictator games, the
prisoner’s dilemma, the gift exchange game, and Bertrand markets. Both
papers derive the economic consequences of the assumption that the agents’
preferences incorporate fairness considerations. However, neither of these
papers sets out to provide a formal answer to the above question.3
3Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) conjecture that an answer may be drawn from evolution-
ary models of cooperation, as proposed by Gu¨th (1995) and others.
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In a recent contribution, Tro¨ger (2002) provides a foundation for the eco-
nomic rationale of fairness in a set-up that is similar to ours.4 His paper
considers a two-stage game of joint production between two agents. In the
rst stage, one agent makes a unilateral investment. In the second stage,
there is a Nash demand game that determines the distribution of the gains
from investment. While the Nash demand game has a continuum of equilib-
rium outcomes, Tro¨ger shows that evolutionary forces may select one equi-
librium in which the division of the gains from investment critically depends
on prior investment. Tro¨ger argues that this result stands in contrast to
the established paradigm of backwards induction, and to the irrelevance of
sunk costs suggested by standard economic theory. Tro¨ger’s analysis o!ers
valuable insights into the origin of fair bargaining outcomes. However, his
analysis cannot rationalize fairness preferences as put forward in the studies
cited above. Indeed, in his model evolution does not discriminate between
agents with di!erent utility specications. Instead, as mentioned above, evo-
lution serves as a device selecting one of many a priori equivalent equilibria.
All agents in Tro¨ger’s model have standard preferences. His model therefore
appears less suitable as a foundation for fairness preferences.
The present paper rationalizes fairness preferences in a hold-up situation
based on the idea that such preferences may create better incentives for a
joint production than the traditional utility specication. The model as-
4See also Ellingson and Robles (2002), and Goree and Holt (2002).
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sumes a disutility from inequality, so that unfair outcomes come as a cost to
the individual members of a society. Still, as mentioned before, the division
of the gains of production is a non-cooperative game with strictly opposing
preferences over the e"cient frontier. The benecial e!ect of fairness pref-
erences comes about because, in the strategic interactions with the other
agent, disutilities from inequality may lead to a more accurate stock-taking
of past contributions, which would be “sunk” in a society of individuals with
standard utility specication.
In the formal analysis, we consider rst the innite-horizon alternating-o!ers
bargaining game for the case of fairness preferences. We derive an explicit
solution to this bargaining game for a given reference point. Thereafter, it
is assumed that both parties have the ex-ante possibility to invest in a way
that increases joint output. As we can show, under suitable assumptions,
the modication of the utility specication dramatically changes the results
of the bilateral investment game: While traditional utility specications lead
to severe underinvestment due to the hold-up problem, the integration of
inequity aversion may promote investments very close to the e"cient level.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 analyzes the innite-
horizon bargaining model between inequity-averse agents. In Section 3, we
introduce an ex-ante investment stage and derive our main result Theorem
2. Section 4 concludes. The Appendix contains technical proofs.
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2. Bargaining between parties with a reference point
The game structure is as in Rubinstein (1982). There are two parties ! = 1" 2,
who must agree to share a pie of size one. An agreement is a pair (#1" #2) ! <2
satisfying #1 + #2 = 1. We do not restrict shares to be nonnegative. There
are innitely many periods. In all even periods 0, 2, 4 etc., party 1 proposes
an agreement (#1" #2) that party 2 can accept or reject. If 2 accepts any o!er,
the game ends. If 2 rejects 1’s o!er in period 2$, then in period 2$+1, player
2 can in turn propose an agreement (#1" #2) that 1 can accept or reject. If
1 accepts, the game ends. If 1 rejects, then he can make an o!er in the
subsequent period, and so on.
Utility for party ! is assumed to be strictly increasing in the share #! allo-
cated to party !. In addition, we assume that the parties have a common
reference agreement (#ref1 " #
ref
2 ) satisfying #
ref
1 +#
ref
2 = 1. Following the existing
approaches to modeling fairness preferences, the reference point enters the
utility function so that the disutility of a marginal reduction of the share is
larger for shares #! % #
ref
! than for values #! & #
ref
! . Specically, we assume
that the utility function of party ! is given by
'!(#!" #
ref
! " () := )
"
!(#! " *!(#! " #ref! )+ " +!(#ref! " #!)+). (1)
Here, the parameter *! measures the marginal disutility from inequality when
receiving more than the reference level, and +! measures the marginal disu-
tility from inequality when receiving less than the reference level, where
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0 # *! # +! % 1. The parameter )! ! (0; 1) is the discount factor of party !,
and (#)+ := max{0; #}. If no agreement is reached in nite time, then utility
is zero for both parties.5
It follows from (1) that the reference agreement, if obtained in the initial
period, will generate a reference utility pair ('ref1 " '
ref
2 ) := (#
ref
1 " #
ref
2 ). More-
over, as the utility function of party ! is strictly increasing in its share #!, for
! = 1" 2, it should be clear that a party can achieve a utility level above the
reference value only if it obtains more than in the reference agreement. In
the linear analysis without social utility components (i.e., *1" *2" +1" +2 = 0),
the reference agreement will not a!ect the outcome of the game. However,
as will become clear later, when players care about the relative sizes of their
payo!s, this parameter will be of relevance.
We start the analysis of the game by determining the bargaining set that
results from possible agreements in the initial period. In the linear case
the bargaining set is just a straight line. With inequity-averse preferences,
however, the bargaining set possesses a characteristic kink at the reference
agreement, as depicted in Figure 1. The following proposition describes the - place
Figure 1
here -
5The reader will note that the form of preferences is similar to the specication in Fehr
and Schmidt (1999). In fact, for !ref! = 1"2, and for a common discount factor #, the utility
specication amounts to
$!(!!%
1
2
% &) = #"!! " '!
2
(#"!! " #"!#)+ " (!
2
(#"!# " #"!!)+,
where !# = 1"!! is the share allocated to party ). As we will see in Section 3, the purpose
of the somewhat generalized set-up is to allow for the possibility that the parties consider
a division of the pie as fair that gives shares of di!erent size to the individual parties.
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bargaining set formally. It can be derived without much di"culty from the
utility specication (1). Now, and throughout the paper, we will denote by
, the party that is not !.
Proposition 1. Denote by ('ref1 " '
ref
2 ) the reference point of the bargaining
parties. Assume that an agreement (#1" #2) is reached in period ( = 0, yielding
a utility pair ('1" '2). Then '# = -#('!" '
ref
! ), where
-#('!" '
ref
! ) := 1" '! " .!('! " 'ref! )+ "
.#
1 + .#
('ref! " '!)+,
and
.! :=
*! + +#
1" *! $ 0.
Proof. Assume rst '! # 'ref! . Then,
'! = (1 + +!)#! " +!#ref! . (2)
On the other hand, '# $ 'ref# and therefore
'# = (1" *#)## + *##ref# . (3)
Replacing ## by 1"#! and #ref# by 1"#ref! in (3), and subsequently eliminating
#! using (2) yields the assertion for '! # 'ref! . The proof for the case '! & 'ref!
is analogous and therefore omitted. !
As we show in the Appendix, a straightforward adaptation of an argument
given by Shaked and Sutton (1984) reveals that the bargaining game pos-
sesses a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium, yielding a utility of '!! for the
9
party ! that makes the initial o!er in the respective subgame. The pair
('!! " '
!
#) is characterized by the two equations
-1('
!
2) = )1'
!
1 and -2('
!
1) = )2'
!
2, (4)
where we ignore the second argument of the functions -!(/" /) for simplicity.
These equations allow a graphical interpretation, as shown in Figure 1. We
denote by
0! :=
1" )#
1" )!)# (5)
the equilibrium share for party ! in the linear model, when ! makes the rst
proposal. Recall that 1"0! = )#0# for ! = 1" 2. The solution of the bargaining
game can then be summarized as follows.
Theorem 1. Assume that the parties have fairness preferences (1) based
on the common reference agreement (#ref! " #
ref
# ). Assume also that bargaining
is e!cient, i.e., -#(0" #
ref
! ) & 0. Consider a subgame in which party ! makes
the initial o"er. Then the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium in the subgame
gives party ! a utility of
'!! (#
ref
! " #
ref
# ) =
!""""""#""""""$
0!(1" .!
1 + .!
#ref# } if #ref! # 0"! ,
(1" )#)(1 + .#) + {.!(1 + .#) + )#.#}#ref!
(1 + .!)(1 + .#)" )!)# if 0
"
! % #
ref
! % 0
+
! ,
0!(1 + .##
ref
# ) if #
ref
! $ 0+! ,
where
0"! : =
)!0!
1 + .!0#
! (0; 0!),
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0+! : =
0!(1 + .#)
1 + .#0!
! [0!; 1). (6)
The utility of the other party in the subgame is equal to )#'
!
#(#
ref
# " #
ref
! ). The
outcome is achieved in the initial period. Moreover, the functions '!! (#
ref
! " #
ref
# )
are continuous for ! = 1" 2.
Proof. See the Appendix. !
The rst case in the statement of Theorem 1 corresponds to a situation where
the reference share for party ! is comparably low. In such a situation, the
bargaining set, when compared to the one in Figure 1, would be shifted up
and to the left along the dotted diagonal. The subgame-perfect equilibrium
would then predict a utility prole that is on the lower right segment of
this bargaining set. As a consequence, party ! receives more than his or her
reference share, while party , receives less than in the reference agreement.
The second case in the statement of the Theorem is depicted in Figure 1.
Here, party !, if the rst to make an o!er, receives again more than the
reference share, and party , less. Finally, in the third case, the bargaining
set would be shifted down and to the right, when compared to the one shown
in Figure 1. Now the outcome would lie on the left upper segment of the
bargaining set, giving party ! a share below the reference point, and party ,
a share above it.
In a way summarizing the above mechanics, Figure 2 shows the equilibrium - place
Figure 2
here -utility of the rst-moving party as a function of the reference level. The
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critical property of this function is that, in contrast to the model with linear
utility specication, the equilibrium utility '!! is strictly increasing in the ref-
erence share #ref! for values below 0
+
! . As we will see in Section 3, this feature
of the equilibrium utility implies that incentives to invest are much stronger
for inequity-averse parties than for parties with a linear utility. Maybe sur-
prisingly at rst sight, the equilibrium utility is strictly decreasing in the
reference share #ref! for values #
ref
! & 0
+
! . This e!ect comes about because for
high reference values, the equilibrium outcome of the bargaining game will
be on the upper left segment of the bargaining set (see Figure 1). A mar-
ginal increase in #ref! shifts the bargaining set downwards and to the right,
decreasing the equilibrium utility for party !.
Another feature of the equilibrium is that for reference levels in the interval
(0"! ; 0
+
! ), the bargaining procedure will result in a share for party ! that is
close to #ref! . In fact, as can be seen from Figure 1, the more patient the
parties, the closer will be the equilibrium utility to the reference share in this
area. The consequence of this e!ect is that su"ciently patient parties receive
almost precisely the reference share, provided that the reference agreement
is close enough to an equal division of the pie. This feature will be of central
relevance in our discussion of e"cient investment in the subsequent section.
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3. Sunk costs
We will now extend the model by assuming that the size of the pie to be di-
vided between the two parties depends on specic investments made in some
ex-ante stage. The objective will be to compare incentives for investment for
individuals with a standard utility function to the corresponding incentives
of individuals with fairness preferences.
To simplify matters, we will consider a symmetric set-up from now onwards.
Let the common parameters of inequality aversion be denoted by * := *1 =
*2 and + := +1 = +2. Let 11 $ 0 and 12 $ 0 denote the investment levels
of parties 1 and 2, respectively. The costs of investments 1! for party ! are
denoted by 2(1!). The function 2(/) satises 2(0) = 0, and is assumed to
be strictly increasing, convex, and twice di!erentiable. Investments a!ect
the ex-post surplus, i.e., the total value of an agreement 3 = 3(11" 12) $ 0.
The production function 3(/" /) is assumed to be symmetric, i.e., 3(1!" 1#) =
3(1#" 1!). Moreover, we require 3(/; /) to be strictly increasing in both 11 and
12, and to be strictly concave as well as di!erentiable.
The e"cient investment levels (1!1 " 1
!
2) are characterized by the rst-order
conditions
43
41!
(1!" 1#) = 2
0(1!), ! = 1" 2.
Holmstro¨m (1982) showed that an e"cient investment cannot be obtained
in this set-up with a sharing rule that depends only on 3. E.g., if parties
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with linear utility functions divide the surplus according to the sharing rule
suggested by alternating o!ers bargaining then investment levels (1 lin1 " 1
lin
2 )
will be characterized by the rst-order conditions
01
43
411
(11" 12) = 2
0(11) (7)
(1" 01) 43
412
(11" 12) = 2
0(12). (8)
As a consequence of the so-called double marginalization of rents, investment
is ine"cient for 01 ! (0; 1). In the context of specic investments made into
a long-term relationship, this incentive problem causes the well-known hold-
up problem (see, e.g., Williamson, 1975, Grossman and Hart, 1986, Che and
Hausch, 1999, and Maskin and Tirole, 1999).
We will now investigate the impact of inequity aversion on this outcome. The
probably most natural candidate for a utility specication would start from
net present values for the individual parties given by
5!(1!" 1#" #!" () = )
"#!3(1!" 1#)" 2(1!),
and dene inequity-averse utility for party ! as
b6!(5!"5#) := 5! " b*(5! "5#)+ " b+(5# "5!)+
for parameters b* and b+. Unfortunately, this specication leads to a non-
stationary bargaining problem when the parties choose heterogeneous in-
vestment levels in the ex-ante stage. Indeed, as the size of the pie shrinks
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over time, while investments costs do not decline, the fair division of the cake
would attribute a share that increases in ( to the party that invested more
ex ante, and a share that is decreasing in ( to the party that invested less.
To avoid this complication, we will assume in the sequel that the parties
have a stationary reference level in the form of a share #ref! of the overall pie
that is created by the joint contribution. The utility component representing
inequity aversion will be assumed to vary proportionally with the size of the
pie. E.g., the utility loss of receiving a payo! of 100 currency units when
the other party receives 120 is, measured in monetary terms, just twice the
utility loss of receiving 50, when the other party ends up with 60. Under
these assumptions, utility is given by
6!(1!" 1#) = )
"(#! " *(#! " #ref! )+ " +(#ref! " #!)+)3(1!" 1#)" 2(1!), (9)
where 0 % ) % 1 is the common discount factor. This specic form in not
fully unplausible in our view, and turns out to be analytically very convenient.
Also, while we solve the model only for this specic utility specication, we
conjecture that the results do not depend on it in a critical way.
Our next assumption concerns the choice of the reference share #ref! . We
believe that there are many plausible candidates for such a reference point.
Moreover, the reference point could depend in principle on many character-
istics of the contributing parties and the situation. In this study, we will
focus on one specic case, and assume that individuals are concerned with
15
an ex-post equal economic prot. To derive this reference point, note that
the agreement (#ref1 " #
ref
2 ) that puts parties 1 and 2 into an equivalent economic
post-bargaining position satises
#ref1 3(11" 12)" 2(11) = #ref2 3(11" 12)" 2(12). (10)
A simple calculation using #ref1 + #
ref
2 = 1 shows that the reference share for
party ! is then given by
#ref! (1!" 1#) =
1
2
+
2(1!)" 2(1#)
23(1!" 1#)
, (11)
provided that 3(1!" 1#) & 0. In the sequel, we will assume that the parties
engage ex post in alternating-o!ers bargaining using this reference level.6
Proposition 2. For any given investment level 1# of rm ,, the reference
share #ref! (1!" 1#) is strictly increasing in 1!.
Proof. See the Appendix. !
Wewill now state conditions under which e"cient pair of investments (11" 12) =
(1!" 1!) can be approximated as an equilibrium outcome between inequity-
averse parties. One central condition concerns the protability of production.
With an unprotable production, the reference share may react very strongly
to small changes in investments. However, as can be seen from Figure 2, if
6The reference share described by (11) may appear intuitively too high o! the equilib-
rium path, e.g., if party * chooses an ine"ciently high investment level. However, it will
be noted that a lower reference share o! the equilibrium path would ceteris paribus lead
to lower prot for the deviating party, and thus enforce our argument.
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investments are lowered, then the equilibrium utility '!! does not decline at
the same rate as the reference value. This could make it attractive for one
party ! to lower the investment somewhat so that the reference share would
drop below 0"! .
7
It turns out that the appropriate degree of protability depends on the degree
of inequity aversion, and is given by
2(1!)
3(0" 1!)
%
*+ +
2" *+ + . (12)
As the right-hand side of the inequality is always smaller than 1, the condition
presupposes that 2(1!) % 3(0" 1!) in the rst place. Note that, for linear
utilities, the right-hand side of (12) will disappear so that the condition
cannot be satised in the traditional set-up. As we show in the proof of the
subsequent result, condition (12) makes sure that the reference share of a
deviating player cannot fall below 0". With these conditions we can prove
our main result:
Theorem 2. Consider the symmetric two-stage model of joint production
introduced in the text above. Assume that the parties’ utility functions exhibit
inequity-aversion as specied in (9) with + & 0. Assume also that reference
shares are formed on the basis of equal economic performance, as specied
7Indeed, one can show that the equilibrium share function for party * has always an
upwards kink at +!, as suggested by Figure 2. This feature of the equilibrium implies
that a party’s objective function is non-concave for low values of the reference share, i.e.,
in a neighborhood of +!. Condition (12), specied below, ensures that this non-concavity
is not reached by !ref! (,!% ,#) if the other party ) chooses an investment level ,# close to ,
".
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in (10). Assume nally that unilateral production is su!ciently protable as
captured by condition (12). Then for any 7 & 0, there is a common discount
factor e) such that for any ) ! (e); 1), the equilibrium investment level of each
party lies in the interval (1! " 7; 1! + 7).
Proof. See the Appendix. !
The idea of the proof is as follows. From our earlier results, it follows that for
su"ciently patient parties, and for a reference share #ref! close to 182, the out-
come of the bargaining game will close to the reference share. The reference
share, however, is a function of the relative size of investments made in the
rst period. This provides nearly e"cient incentives for ex-ante investments
in an intermediary range of investment levels. The protability assumption
implies now that the reference value is not too responsive to investments.
E.g., as can be seen from (11), if production become more e"cient ceteris
paribus, then #ref! moves to 182. The protability assumption thereby ensures
that the reference level never falls below 0"! , even for a one-sided deviation
to zero investments. As can be seen from Figure 2, this guarantees that
the equilibrium utility '!! is a concave function of the reference share, and
therefore of the investment in the rst-stage. It is possible that for a very
high investment, the reference share will exceed 0+! . However, the kink at 0
+
!
reduces the marginal return from investment and makes overinvestment less
attractive. As a consequence, a deviation is not attractive. For ) % 1, this
implies e"cient incentives for investment.
18
4. Conclusion
This paper has studied the innite-horizon alternating-o!ers bargaining game
for the case of inequity-averse preferences. It has been shown that under
inequity aversion, there is a shift of the bargaining outcome towards fair
division. When the parties may engage in ex-ante investments to enlarge the
surplus that is to be divided ex post, then the outcome of the non-cooperative
bargaining game will attribute a larger share to the party that invested more.
This e!ect was shown to reduce incentive problems in team production and
hold-up problems. We conclude that communities consisting of inequity-
averse individuals might be able to o!er a better protection of relationship-
specic investments than economies consisting of individuals with standard
utility specication. In particular, this argument would provide an economic
rationale for the apparent prevalence of fairness preferences in the laboratory.
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Appendix
This appendix contains proofs of Theorem 1, Proposition 2, and Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof has two parts. In the rst part, we
show that the bargaining game between parties with a reference point has
a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. We are explicit here because of the
possibility of negative utility from unfair outcomes, which is usually excluded
in standard approaches. Cf., e.g., Rubinstein (1982, Assumption A-2). In
the second part of the proof, we derive explicitly the parties’ equilibrium
utilities as a function of the reference level and of the fairness parameters.
Part 1. The second step of the subsequent argument is adapted from Fu-
denberg and Tirole (1991, Subsection 4.4.2), who use the following notation.
Let 9! and 9!, respectively, denote the inmum and the supremum of the
set of utilities that ! may obtain in some subgame-perfect equilibrium of the
bargaining game, in which ! makes the initial o!er. Similarly, let :! and :!,
respectively, denote the inmum and the supremum of the set of utilities that
! may obtain in some subgame-perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game,
in which , makes the initial o!er.
Step 1. We claim that in any Nash equilibrium of the bargaining game,
party ! obtains a non-negative utility. To see why, note that otherwise, party
! could deviate protably to the following strategy. If #ref! $ 0, then ! would
always propose a share of #! = #
ref
! , and reject all o!ers made by party ,. If
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#ref! % 0, then ! would always propose a share of
#! =
*!
1" *! |#
ref
! |,
and reject all o!ers made by party ,. It is easy to check that this strategy
guarantees a utility of at least zero. This proves the claim. By symmetry,
the claim is likewise true for party ,, so that party ! cannot get more than
-!(0) in any Nash equilibrium. We therefore get
0 # 9! # 9! # -!(0). (13)
Step 2. Consider now an o!er by party !. It is clear that party , accepts
any o!er above )#9#. Hence
9! $ -!()#9#). (14)
Also, party ! will not o!er more than )#9#. Thus,
:# # )#9#. (15)
Party !’s o!er will be either accepted or rejected. If accepted, it can give !
at most -!()#9#). If rejected, party ! obtains at most )!:!. Therefore
9! # max{-!()#9#)" )!:!}
# max{-!()#9#)" )2! 9!}, (16)
where we have used (15) in the second inequality. We claim that
max{-!()#9#)" )2! 9!} = -!()#9#). (17)
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Indeed, if (17) is violated, then 9! # )2! 9! from (16). But then 9! = 9! = 0 by
(13) and ) % 1. However, this would imply 9# $ -#(0) by (14), which implies
9# = 9# = -#(0) using (13) again. But then, because the e"cient frontier is
attractive, we have 0 % )#9# % -#(0). Using (14) again, this yields
9! & -!()#9#) & 0,
and contradicts 9! = 0. This proves our claim (17). Combining this with
(16), we have therefore shown
9! # -!()#9#). (18)
Step 3. From inequalities (14), (18), and their symmetric counterparts, not-
ing that -!(/) and -#(/) are strictly decreasing and mutually inverse functions,
we nd the two central inequalities
-#(9!) # )#-#()!9!), (19)
-#(9!) $ )#-#()!9!). (20)
From (13) and from the fact that the function
'! 7"% -#('!)" )#-#()!'!)
is strictly decreasing on the interval [0; -!(0)], it follows that (19) and (20)
must be equalities. Thus, in any subgame-perfect equilibrium, the party !
that makes the initial o!er receives a utility '!! := 9! = 9!, characterized by
-#('
!
! ) = )#-#()!'
!
! ). (21)
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Consider now the party , that does not make the initial o!er. A rejection to
an o!er by ! secures party , a utility of )#'
!
# . Thus, :# $ )#'!# . Using (15),
we get that the equilibrium utility for party , amounts to
)#'
!
# = :# = :#. (22)
This shows the uniqueness of the subgame-perfect equilibrium utilities. The
argument that even the subgame-perfect equilibrium prole is unique given
that utilities are unique can be found in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, p. 116)
and is therefore omitted.
Part 2. Starting from a subgame-perfect equilibrium in the bargaining game
characterized by a share '!! for the rst-moving party !, we have precisely
one of the following three cases.
Case A. '!! # 'ref! . By Proposition 1, in this case,
-#('!) = 1" 1
1 + .#
'! " .#
1 + .#
#ref! (23)
for '! = '
!
! and for '! = )!'
!
! . Equilibrium is characterized by
)#-#()!'
!
! ) = -#('
!
! ). (24)
Combining the last equations and rearranging yields
'!! = 0!(1 + .##
ref
# ). (25)
Thus, case A occurs only if
0!(1 + .##
ref
# ) # #ref! . (26)
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Rewriting (26) yields #ref! $ 0+! , where 0+! is dened as in the statement of the
Theorem. However, it is likewise clear that if #ref! $ 0+! , then (25) constitutes
an equilibrium outcome.
Case B. )!'
!
! $ 'ref! . We nd from Proposition 1 that
-#('!) = 1" (1 + .!)'! + .!#ref!
for '! = '
!
! and for '! = )!'
!
! . Thus, in equilibrium we have
'!! = 0!{1"
.!
1 + .!
#ref# }. (27)
Hence, in case B we have
)!0!{1" .!
1 + .!
#ref# } $ #ref! .
Rearranging yields #ref! # 0"! . It is not di"cult to check that if this is true,
we have an equilibrium given by (27).
Case C. '!! & '
ref
! and )!'
!
! % '
ref
! . Proposition 1 yields for this case
-#('
!
! ) = 1" (1 + .!)'!! + .!#ref! (28)
-#()!'
!
! ) = 1"
1
1 + .#
)!'
!
! "
.#
1 + .#
#ref! . (29)
Plugging equations (28) and (29) into (24) and rearranging yields the for-
mula for '!! given in the statement of the Theorem for values 0
"
! % #
ref
! % 0
+
! .
Because existence and uniqueness of the subgame-perfect equilibrium is guar-
anteed for all 'ref! ! [0; 1], case C will occur if and only if neither case A nor
case B occurs.
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The assertion concerning the utility of the second-moving party , follows
from (22). A long, but straightforward calculation shows that '!! (#
ref
! " #
ref
# ) is
continuous at #ref! = 0
"
! and at #
ref
! = 0
+
! . This proves the Theorem. !
Proof of Proposition 2. Fix 1# $ 0, and write 2# := 2(1#). Because the
function 2(1!) is strictly increasing, convex, and di!erentiable in 1!, there is an
inverse function ;(2!) that is strictly increasing, concave, and di!erentiable
in 2! = 2(1!). To prove the claim, it su"ces to show that the function
<(2!) :=
2! " 2#
3(;(2!)" 1#)
is strictly increasing in 2!. The rst-order derivative reads
<0(2!) =
3(;(2!)" 1#)" (2! " 2#) 43
41!
(;(2!)" 1#);
0(2!)
3(;(2!)" 1#)2
.
Obviously, the function <(/) is strictly increasing in 2! as long as 2! # 2#. But
for 2! & 2#, this is likewise the case because 3 $ 0, and the function that
maps 2! into 3(;(2!)" 1#) is strictly concave. !
Proof of Theorem 2. The strategy of the proof is to construct, for any
given ) that is su"ciently close to 1, a subgame-perfect equilibrium, such that
the corresponding levels of bilateral investments approximate (1!" 1!). Fix
for the moment some discount factor ) ! (0; 1). Note that in this symmetric
set-up, the parameters 0!, 0
"
! , 0
+
! , and .! are independent of !, so that we
can drop the index ! in the sequel. From Proposition 2, we know that for
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any given investment level 1# $ 0 for party ,, there are investment levels
1+! = 1
+
! (1#) ! <+0 & {'} and 1"! = 1"! (1#) ! <+0 such that #ref! $ 0+ if and
only if 1! $ 1+! , and such that #ref! % 0" if and only if 1! % 1"! . Fix now an
investment level 1#. Then
6!(1!" 1#) = {=!(1!" 1#) + >!(1!" 1#)#ref! (1!" 1#)}3(1!" 1#)" 2(1!),
where the functions =!(1!" 1#) and >!(1!" 1#) are given by Theorem 1. These
functions are piecewise constant, with jumps at values 1"! (1#) and 1
+
! (1#).
Rewriting yields
6!(1!" 1#) = {=! + >!
2
}3(1!" 1#)" (1" >!
2
)2(1!)" >!
2
2(1#), (30)
where we ignore the arguments of =! and >!. The rst-order conditions are
given by
{=! + >!
2
} 43
41!
" (1" >!
2
)
42
41!
= 0, (31)
for ! = 1" 2. Denote by (1#1 ())" 1
#
2 ())) the solution to the rst-order conditions
(31) assuming that the parameters =! and >! are as in the intermediary case
1"! # 1! % 1+! . A straightforward calculation using (31) and Theorem 1
shows that for ! = 1" 2, we have 1#! ()) % 1! for ) % 1. We will prove now
that (1#1 ())" 1
#
2 ())) is an equilibrium in the investment stage. Clearly, for
) su"ciently close to one, |2(1#! ())) " 2(1## ()))| is arbitrarily small, so that
#ref! (1
#
1 ()); 1
#
2 ())) is close to 1/2. At the same time,
0" % 1
2 + .
and 0+ % 1" 1
2 + .
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for ) % 1, so that for ) su"ciently close to 1, we get
1"! (1
#
# ())) % 1
#
! ()) % 1
+
! (1
#
# ())).
Thus, the rst-order condition combined with the concavity of (30) yields
that 1#! ()) is an optimal response to 1
#
# ()) on the interval
[1"! (1
#
# ())); 1
+
! (1
#
# ()))].
To check that 1#! ()) is optimal also globally, we consider rst the deviation
to some 1! $ 1+! (1## ())). By the continuity of 6!(1!" 1## ())) at 1! = 1+! (1## ())),
it su"ces to show that 46!(1!" 1
#
# ()))841! is jumping downwards at 1! =
1+! (1
#
# ())). To see why this is true, note that
46!
41!
=
4'!!
4#ref!
4#ref!
41!
3 + '!!
43
41!
" 42
41!
,
and recall from Theorem 1 that 4'!! 84#
ref
! is jumping downwards at 1! =
1+! (1
#
# ())), while 4#
ref
! 841! & 0 by Proposition 2. This proves that an upwards
deviation is not attractive. To ensure that also a downward deviation is not
protable, it su"ces to guarantee that 1"! (1
#
# ())) # 0 or, equivalently, that
1
2
+
2(0)" 2(1## ()))
23(0" 1## ()))
$ )0
1 + .0
. (32)
This condition is satised if
2(1## ()))
3(0" 1## ()))
# 1" 2)0
1 + .0
.
For ) close to one, this condition, in turn, follows from the protability
assumption (12). Thus, the investment level 1#! is an optimal response to
27
1## . The analysis of player ,’s investment decision follows the same steps and
is therefore omitted. This proves the assertion. !
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